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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND THE STANDARD OF
MATERIALITY: WHY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SHOULD USE THE
REASONABLE PATENT EXAMINER STANDARD

I. INTRODUCTION
Alleged patent infringers frequently assert the defense of inequitable
conduct in patent infringement suits.1 Under this defense the alleged
infringing party must prove the patent holder intentionally misrepresented,
withheld, or falsified material references while prosecuting its patent before the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).2 There is much dispute over what
standard courts should use to determine whether a reference is material.3 This
topic is important because there are serious consequences if a court determines
a patent applicant intentionally misrepresented, withheld, or falsified material
information. One consequence of a court finding that inequitable conduct
occurred in procuring a patent is a ruling that the patent in question is
unenforceable and any other patents connected to it are also unenforceable.4
There are many different tests courts have used to determine what
references are material. Before 1977, courts used a “but for” standard to
determine whether a reference was material.5 In 1977, the PTO adopted a
“reasonable patent examiner” subjective standard to determine whether a
reference was material in its rule entitled “Duty to Disclose Information
1. Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 85–86 (1993).
2. Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citing Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
3. Dayco Products, 329 F.3d at 1364.
The court has not decided whether it should adhere to the preexisting standard for
inequitable conduct in prosecutions occurring after the effective date of the new rule.
Thus, we have not decided whether the standard for materiality in inequitable conduct
cases is governed by equitable principles or by the Patent Office’s rules.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted); Scott D. Anderson, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems
and Recommended Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 854–57 (1999); Goldman, supra note 1,
at 72–75.
4. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding one patent
unenforceable for inequitable conduct and a second patent, which issued as a divisional from the
first patent, unenforceable for relying on the first patent).
5. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03[3], at 19-218 (Matthew Bender &
Co. 2004). If a patent would not have issued “but for” the patent holder’s omission of the
reference, then that reference is material. Id; see discussion infra Parts III.A–C.
1327
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Material to Patentability” (commonly referred to as Rule 56).6 In 1992, the
PTO amended Rule 56, adopting an objective standard focusing on prima facie
patentability.7
In deciding which test for materiality best serves the purposes of the
inequitable conduct defense, there are some perceived dangers which must be
addressed. If the definition for materiality includes too much information, then
it will encourage alleged infringers to assert the defense in every case, creating
inefficiencies in the court system and increased legal fees.8 If the definition for
materiality does not include enough information, then it will not effectively
punish dishonest applicants or encourage applicants to disclose all information
the PTO needs to assess patentability.9
From Congress’s creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 until 2005, the
court used the old Rule 56 “reasonable patent examiner” standard to determine
materiality.10 In 2005, the Federal Circuit decided that for applications
pending on or filed after March 16, 1992, it would use the new Rule 56
objective standard to determine materiality.11 Because the Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases and the Supreme Court has not
changed the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of inequitable conduct, the Federal
Circuit’s decisions on inequitable conduct state the current law.12
While all of the tests courts have used to determine materiality have some
shortcomings, this Comment argues that the Federal Circuit and the PTO
should adopt the old Rule 56 “reasonable patent examiner” standard to
determine whether a reference is material. This test best furthers the main
purpose of the doctrine of inequitable conduct, which is to punish applicants
who intentionally misrepresent, withhold, or falsify information during the
application process. The old Rule 56 subjective test for determining
materiality best serves the punishment purpose because it is expansive enough
to give the doctrine of inequitable conduct some teeth, and it allows the court
to make an equitable determination based on all the facts to decide whether
6. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977) (providing that “information is material where there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether
to allow the application to issue as a patent”); see discussion infra Part III.D.
7. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2004) (providing that “information is material to patentability
when . . . (1) It establishes . . . a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) It refutes, or
is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability
relied on by the Office, or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability”); see discussion infra Part
III.E.
8. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 846–47; Jerome G. Lee, Evolution and Future of New
Rule 56 and the Duty of Candor, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 131, 132 (1992).
9. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 867–68.
10. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 72–73.
11. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
12. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 67–68.
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information is material. Three of the other tests used for inequitable conduct
have narrower definitions of materiality and give the court less leeway to find
inequitable conduct based on the facts. The last test has a broader definition of
materiality, but it is too speculative and would create a burden on the court
system.
Part II of this Comment explains general concepts of the defense of
inequitable conduct in patent infringement proceedings. Part III explains how
the five tests courts have used to determine materiality operate. Part IV
explores the general policies of inequitable conduct the standard of materiality
should serve. Finally, Part V gives reasons why courts should use the old Rule
56 “reasonable patent examiner” standard.
II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN GENERAL
In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must comply with the statutory
requirements of the United States Code on Patents. To obtain a patent on an
invention, the statutes require all inventors of the invention to file or authorize
the filing of the patent application,13 and the invention must be of patentable
subject matter,14 novel,15 non-obvious,16 and useful.17 The patent application
13. “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not himself invent the subject
matter sought to be patented . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2000). “An application for patent shall be
made, or authorized to be made, by the inventor . . . .” Id. § 111(a). “The applicant shall make
oath that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or improvement thereof, for which he solicits a
patent . . . .” Id. § 115. “When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall
apply for patent jointly and each make the required oath . . . .” Id. § 116.
14. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Id. § 101.
15. Id. § 102.
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or . . . .
....
(e) the invention was described in—
(1) an application for patent, published . . . by another filed in the United States
before the invention by the applicant for patent or
(2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United
States before the invention by the applicant for patent . . . or
....
(g) . . . (2) before such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this
country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
16. Id. § 103(a).
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1330

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1327

must also meet the specification requirements. The application must contain a
specification with a written description of the invention, enabling one skilled in
the art to practice the invention, and setting forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of practicing the invention.18 The specification must end with
claims sufficiently definite to point out and distinctly identify the subject
matter of the invention.19 An inventor may lose the right to patent if: (1) the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in the United
States or a foreign country more than one year prior to the United States patent
application,20 (2) the invention was in public use, or on sale in the United
States more than one year prior to the United States patent application,21 (3)
the inventor abandoned the invention,22 or (4) the inventor patented the
invention in a foreign country before the date of the United States patent
application and the foreign patent application was filed more than one year
before the United States application.23
Even if an inventor follows all of these statutory requirements and obtains
a valid patent on an invention, the doctrine of inequitable conduct can render
the patent unenforceable.24 If a patentee asserts his statutory right to exclude
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
17. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, [etc.] . . . .” Id. § 101
(emphasis added).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
19. “The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” Id. § 112.
20. “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was patented or described
in a printed publication in this or a foreign country . . . more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States . . . .” Id. § 102(b).
21. “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was . . . in public use or
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States . . . .” Id. § 102(b)
22. “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he has abandoned the invention . . . .”
Id. § 102(c).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d).
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was first patented or caused
to be patented . . . by the applicant . . . in a foreign country prior to the date of the
application for patent in this country on an application for patent . . . filed more than
twelve months before the filing of the application in the United States . . . .
Id.
24. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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by bringing a suit for infringement against an alleged infringer, the alleged
infringer may plead the statutory defense of unenforceability.25 Inequitable
conduct falls within this statutory defense.26 If the court finds the patentee
engaged in inequitable conduct in the procurement of the patent by
intentionally misrepresenting, withholding, or falsifying material references,
the court will order the patent unenforceable.27
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc. is a typical case where an alleged infringer
asserted the defense of inequitable conduct in an infringement action and the
court held patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.28 Molins, the
patentee, developed a fully automated machining system that allowed
simultaneous machining of related families of parts.29 Molins filed a U.S.
patent on the system in 1966.30 The in-house patent agent for Molins
responsible for prosecuting the patents in suit knew of several published
articles that disclosed an automatic manufacturing system similar to Molins’s
invention, but failed to disclose the articles to the PTO during prosecution of
the patent.31 The court held Molins engaged in inequitable conduct because it
intentionally failed to disclose material information to the PTO during patent
prosecution.32 The court found the articles were material to patentability
because a reasonable patent examiner would have considered them important
in deciding the patentability of the claims in the patent application.33 The court
reasoned that the articles were material for three reasons: (1) they disclosed
relevant features of the claimed invention that were not found anywhere else in
the prior art, (2) Molins disclosed the articles in foreign patent applications
where foreign patent examiners found they were pertinent prior art, and (3)
Molins amended its foreign claims based on the articles.34 Molins disclosed
the articles to the PTO seventeen years after learning of them, and in a
reexamination proceeding, the PTO found that Molins’s issued patent was
valid in light of the articles.35 Thus, even though Molins’s patent would have
been valid if it had disclosed the articles when first discovered, the court held
Molins’s patent unenforceable because it engaged in inequitable conduct by
intentionally withholding the articles for seventeen years.36
25. “The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a
patent . . . unenforceability . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 282(1).
26. E.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
27. E.g., Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182.
28. Id. at 1172.
29. Id. at 1176.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1176–77.
32. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182.
33. Id. at 1180.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1177, 1179.
36. Id. at 1182.
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Molins illustrates how a court may hold a patent unenforceable that
otherwise meets all the statutory requirements of patentability. Inequitable
conduct can make an otherwise valid patent unenforceable.
The current statutory basis for the defense of inequitable conduct arose
from several acts of Congress beginning with the Patent Act of 1790, which
allowed a private cause of action filed within one year of issuance to repeal a
patent “obtained surreptitiously . . . or upon false suggestion.”37 Since the
Patent Act of 1790, Congress has broadened and evolved the inequitable
conduct defense. The Patent Act of 1793 extended the period of filing to three
years.38 The Patent Act of 1836 created a defense to infringement for an
improperly obtained patent.39 The Consolidated Patent Act of 1870 made the
defense available against an issued patent procured by a deceptive
application.40 The current statute taken from the Patent Act of 1952 gives an
alleged infringer a defense to infringement for “unenforceability.”41 The
Federal Circuit holds inequitable conduct to fall within the defense of
unenforceability.42 Even though Congress created a statutory defense for
improperly obtained patents, courts were reluctant to recognize it until 1945,
when the Supreme Court recognized that the public suffered injury through the
fraudulent procurement of patents.43 Before 1945 courts were reluctant to
allow a third party to raise as a defense to infringement that the patentee
fraudulently procured the patent, because of the common law fraud
requirement that there be injury to the party alleging fraud.44 Previously, the
37. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111; Goldman, supra note 1, at 39–40.
38. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323; Goldman, supra note 1, at 39–40.
39. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 117, 123; Goldman, supra note 1, at 40–42.
40. Consolidated Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208; Goldman, supra note
1, at 42–45.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Goldman, supra note 1, at 52. “The following shall be defenses
in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1)
Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 282
(emphasis added).
42. E.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed Cir. 1984).
43. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see Goldman, supra note 1, at 38–39, 50–
51, from which much of the material for this paragraph was derived.
The possession and assertion of patent rights are “issues of great moment to the
public.” . . . A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. . . . The farreaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from
fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
legitimate scope.
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815–16 (1945) (internal
citations omitted). “Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office or who are
parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to report to it all facts
concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the applications in issue.” Id. at 818.
44. Goldman, supra note 1, at 38–39.
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view was that in a patent case any misrepresentations were made to the
government and thus a private party did not have a right to raise the defense
because it had not suffered an injury.45 It was in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Precision Instrument that the Court recognized fraud in obtaining a patent
not only injured the government, but also the public at large.46
While Congress created a statutory base for inequitable conduct, the
doctrine is a product of common law and legislation.47 The Rules and
Regulations of the Department of Commerce, promulgated by the PTO,
contain Rule 56, a rule which imposes upon applicants a “Duty to Disclose
Information Material to Patentability.”48 For applications pending before
March 16, 1992, the Federal Circuit uses Rule 56 adopted in 1977, but for
applications pending on or filed after March 16, 1992, the Federal Circuit uses
Rule 56 adopted in 1992.49
The defense of inequitable conduct is based on the equity principle that “he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”50 Inequitable conduct is
a defense to patent infringement arising when a patent applicant intentionally
misrepresents a material fact, fails to disclose material information, or submits
false material information.51 To prove inequitable conduct the alleged
infringing party must show by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant
misrepresented, withheld, or falsified material information during the
prosecution of the patent and that the applicant intended its deceptive
conduct.52 Courts perform the inequitable conduct analysis in two steps.53
First, the court determines whether the information misrepresented, withheld,
or falsified meets threshold levels of both (1) materiality and (2) intent to

45. Id.
46. Id.; Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 815–16.
47. Anderson, supra note 3, at 854. Anderson’s article provided much of the information for
this section of the Comment.
48. Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2004). The PTO has the power to promulgate rules of this
nature under 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). “The Office . . . may establish regulations, not inconsistent
with law, which . . . shall be made in accordance with section 553 of title 5 . . . .” 35 U.S.C. §
2(b)(2).
49. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
50. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814; Anderson, supra note 3, at 850. “[T]he doors of a
court of equity [are closed] to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter
in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.”
Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814. “[W]hile ‘equity does not demand that its suitors shall
have led blameless lives,’ as to other matters, it does require that they shall have acted fairly and
without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.” Id. at 814–15 (internal citations omitted).
51. Anderson, supra note 3, at 852; Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329
F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
52. E.g., Dayco Products, 329 F.3d at 1362–63.
53. Id.
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deceive.54 Second, the court weighs the materiality and intent to determine
whether the applicant’s conduct was so culpable as to render the patent
invalid.55 “Materiality and intent are . . . factual issues, but the ultimate
determination of inequitable conduct is an equitable issue committed to the
discretion of the trial court.”56
There is a minimum level of proof that an alleged infringer must offer in
order to establish a prima facie showing of inequitable conduct.57 An alleged
infringer who asserts the defense of inequitable conduct for failure to disclose
“must offer clear and convincing proof of: (1) prior art or information that is
material; (2) knowledge chargeable to applicant of that prior art or information
and of its materiality; and (3) failure of the applicant to disclose the art or
information resulting from an intent to mislead the PTO.”58
After the alleged infringer gives this offer of proof, the applicant has five
primary ways to rebut the charge.59
[Inequitable conduct] may be rebutted by a showing that: (a) the prior art or
information was not material (e.g., because it is less pertinent than or merely
cumulative with prior art or information cited to or by the PTO); (b) if the prior
art or information was material, a showing that applicant did not know of that
art or information; (c) if applicant did know of that art or information, a
showing that applicant did not know of its materiality; [or] (d) [applicant’s
nondisclosure did not intend] to mislead the PTO.60

54. Id.
55. E.g., id. There may be a lesser showing of materiality where high levels of intent to
deceive are present. Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1439 (Fed Cir.
1991). “The more material the omission, the less culpable the intent required, and vice versa.”
Id.
56. Anderson, supra note 3, at 853–54 (citing Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular
Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1439–40).
57. Anderson, supra note 3, at 853; see FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
58. FMC Corp., 835 F.3d at 1415 (footnote omitted); Anderson, supra note 3, at 853 n.60.
The requisite element of intent has undergone change over the years. Until 1988 the Federal
Circuit used a gross negligence standard from which the court could infer the required intent to
deceive. See Lynn C. Tyler, Kingsdown Fifteen Years Later: What Does It Take to Prove
Inequitable Conduct?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 267, 272–73 (2003). In 1988, the Federal Circuit held
that gross negligence was not enough to infer intent to deceive and that for a finding of intent to
deceive, there must be “sufficient culpability” when viewing all the evidence of the involved
persons. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(en banc). In doing so the court rejected prior panel holdings that the court could infer intent to
deceive when an attorney knew a reference was material and did not disclose it to the PTO during
prosecution. Tyler, supra, at 268.
59. Anderson, supra note 3, at 853.
60. FMC Corp., 835 F.2d at 1415; see Anderson, supra note 3, at 853.
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Good faith on the part of the applicant is an additional factor which may rebut
a prima facie case of inequitable conduct.61
During prosecution of a patent the applicant submits information to the
PTO. The applicant has a duty of candor and good faith to not withhold or
misrepresent information material to patentability when submitting information
to the PTO.62 Examples of types of information an applicant must submit to
the PTO in order to meet the duty of candor and good faith include: (1) prior
art references not known to the examiner,63 (2) conduct relevant to statutory
bars,64 (3) experimental data,65 (4) date of invention affidavit,66 and (5) foreign

61. Anderson, supra note 3, at 853; see Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[E]vidence of good faith must be considered in determining whether
inequitable conduct has been shown by clear and convincing evidence. However, good faith is
only one factor to be considered along with the totality of the evidence.” (citation omitted)).
62. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977); Anderson, supra note 3, at 855–56.
63. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see, e.g., Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172,
1184–85 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applicant withheld articles describing a machine similar to the claims
of the invention).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) an application for patent may not issue if the invention was
already known of before the date of invention by the applicant. “[T]he invention was known or
used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
Prior art references are also important in determining whether the invention was not
obvious at the time of invention.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id. § 103(a). However, the applicant cannot commit inequitable conduct by failing to cite prior
art that he has no knowledge of, or which he believes is less relevant than other art already cited
to the PTO. CHISUM, supra note 5, § 19.03[2][b][ii], at 19-184.
64. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see, e.g., Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs.,
Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applicant withheld information from the PTO
regarding its prior sale of the invention claimed); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding patent invalid where applicant
withheld evidence regarding public use and sale of the invention more than one year prior to
when the application was filed).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) an application for patent may not issue if it was not filed
within one year of the invention’s patenting, description, public use, or sale in the United States
or a foreign country. “[T]he invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .” Id.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) an application for patent may not issue if the applicant
patented it in a foreign country based upon an application filed more than one year before the date
of application in the United States.
[T]he invention was first patented or caused to be patented . . . by the applicant . . . in
a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an
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patent office search reports on a companion application.67 The Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure68 identifies three other sources of information that
are material and which an applicant must disclose: (1) information relating to

application for patent or inventor’s certificate filed more than twelve months before the
filing of the application in the United States . . . .
Id. § 102(d).
65. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d
1556, 1570–71 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (applicant submitted falsified affidavits under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132
(“Rule 132”) to the PTO regarding experimental data relevant to its claimed invention). If an
examiner rejects a patent applicant’s claim on the ground that it closely resembles products or
processes in the prior art, the applicant may rebut this prima facie case of obviousness by filing an
affidavit under Rule 132. Using Rule 132 an applicant may present test evidence that shows how
its invention is substantially different from the prior art. Similarly, an applicant may present
technical data and experimental evidence in the specification of its patent application. In both
situations there is a great need to prevent fraudulent conduct, because the PTO has no way of
verifying the tests through its own independent procedures.
66. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see Timely Prod. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 298 (2d
Cir. 1975) (applicant filed an affidavit under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (“Rule 131”) which misled the
patent examiner into granting the applicant an earlier date of invention than the applicant was
entitled to). A date of invention affidavit is filed when an applicant is faced with a rejection
based on prior art shown to exist before his date of application. The applicant may file this
affidavit in order to show that he invented the subject matter sought to be patented before the
prior art was invented, patented, or published. This affidavit is filed under Rule 131, which
states:
When any claim of an application . . . is rejected, the inventor of the subject matter of the
rejected claim . . . may submit an appropriate oath or declaration to establish invention of
the subject matter of the rejected claim prior to the effective date of the reference or
activity on which the rejection is based.
37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (2005). Because the PTO normally relies upon affidavits submitted under Rule
131 as sufficient on their face, the doctrine of inequitable conduct and the penalties resulting from
it are necessary to ensure full, truthful disclosure by an applicant. See generally CHISUM, supra
note 5, § 19.03[2][c], at 19-208.
67. Anderson, supra note 3, at 856; see Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho
Commercial Prod., Inc., 21 F.3d 1068, 1072–73 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applicant found not to have
engaged in inequitable conduct where it withheld from the PTO the basis for the rejection of an
identical European patent because it did so accidentally and without the requisite intent to
deceive). However, the court must exercise caution when basing a finding of inequitable conduct
on proceedings in foreign jurisdictions because of “differences in disclosure requirements, claim
practice, form of application, and standard of patentability.” Molins, 48 F.3d at 1180.
68. “This Manual [of Patent Examining Procedure] is published to provide [PTO] patent
examiners, applicants, [and] attorneys . . . with a reference work on the practices and procedures
relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO. . . . The Manual does not
have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.”
Foreword to U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed., rev. 2005) [hereinafter MPEP].
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or from co-pending United States patent applications, (2) information from
related litigation, and (3) information relating to claims copied from a patent.69
The consequences of a court finding that an applicant engaged in
inequitable conduct can be very severe. Some of the possible sanctions
delivered by courts include: invalidity, unenforceability, cancellation suit,
attorney’s fees, antitrust liability, liability under the Federal Trade Commission
Act, liability under securities laws, recovery of royalties, loss of attorney–
client and work product privileges, disciplinary action against attorneys and
agents, RICO liability, and state law tort claims for unfair competition.70
Over the years courts have used several different tests to determine
whether a reference is material. Before 1977, courts used a “but for” standard
to determine if a reference was material.71 In 1977, the PTO adopted a
“reasonable patent examiner” subjective standard in Rule 56 to determine
whether a reference is material.72 In 1992, the PTO adopted an objective
standard focusing on prima facie patentability.73 The Federal Circuit recently
decided to use the old Rule 56 standard for applications pending before March
16, 1992, and the new Rule 56 test for applications pending on or filed after
March 16, 1992.74 The remainder of this Comment focuses on the tests courts
have used to determine materiality, the general purposes behind inequitable
conduct that the test for materiality should serve, and what test for materiality
best serves the main purpose of the inequitable conduct doctrine.

69. Id. § 2001.06(b)–(d). Rule 56(a) also gives two examples of where the PTO encourages
applicants to look for material information: “(1) [p]rior art cited in search reports of a foreign
patent office in a counterpart application, and (2) [t]he closest information over which individuals
associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application believe any pending claim
patentably defines, to make sure that any material information contained therein is disclosed to
the [PTO].” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2005).
70. See CHISUM, supra note 5, § 19.03[6], at 19-353; Glenn E. Von Tersch, Curing the
Inequitable Conduct Plague in Patent Litigation, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 425–28
(1998).
71. CHISUM, supra note 5, § 19.03[3], at 19-218. If a patent would not have issued “but for”
the patent holder’s omission of the reference then that reference is material. Id.; see infra Parts
III.A–C.
72. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977) (since amended) (providing that “information is material where
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in
deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent”); see infra Part III.D.
73. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2004) (providing that “information is material to patentability
when . . . (1) [i]t establishes . . . a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) [i]t refutes,
or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i) [o]pposing an argument of
unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii) [a]sserting an argument of patentability”); see infra
Part III.E.
74. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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III. EXPLANATION OF TESTS USED TO DETERMINE MATERIALITY
The test for materiality has evolved over the years. From 1945, when the
Supreme Court recognized in Precision Instrument that fraudulently procured
patents harmed the public, until 1982, when Congress created the Federal
Circuit, the circuit courts individually determined what test to use for
inequitable conduct.75 Prior to the 1977 amendment of Rule 56, courts used
three different “but for” tests to determine materiality.76 Under the “objective
but for” test a reference is material only if it would have precluded the issuing
of the patent were it disclosed.77 Under the “subjective but for” test, if a patent
issues based on fraudulent misrepresentations then the information withheld or
misrepresented is deemed to be material.78 The “but it may have” test finds
materiality in information which if disclosed may have precluded the issuance
of the patent.79 Rule 56, as amended in 1977, provided: “[I]nformation is
material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner
would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to
issue as a patent.”80 In 1992 the PTO amended Rule 56 to provide for a more
objective test on what information it deemed material to patentability.81 Under
the new Rule 56, information is material if “[i]t establishes . . . a prima facie
case of unpatentability of a claim.”82 The “objective but for” test, “subjective
but for” test, and “but it may have” test are no longer used by the Federal
Circuit to determine materiality. Currently the Federal Circuit uses the old
Rule 56 reasonable patent examiner standard for patent applications pending
before March 16, 1992, and the new Rule 56 standard for patents pending on
or filed after March 16, 1992.83
A.

“Objective But For” Test

The first “but for” test is called the “objective but for” test. This test finds
materiality in a reference only if the reference would have precluded the

75. Goldman, supra note 1, at 52–67 (discussing the development of the inequitable conduct
doctrine in the circuit courts from 1945–1982).
76. CHISUM, supra note 5, § 19.03[3][a], at 19-219–20.
77. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965); In
re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. 1353, 1368 (D. Del. 1975); Goldman,
supra note 1, at 55.
78. American Cyanamid Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 363 F.2d 757, 778 (6th Cir. 1966);
Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. at 1368; Goldman, supra note 1, at 54.
79. Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. at 1368–69; SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 318
F.Supp. 433, 449–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
80. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977).
81. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2004).
82. Id. at § 1.56(b).
83. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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issuing of the patent.84 To apply this test the court must first make a
determination of invalidity based on the prior art that was not disclosed.85 This
test for materiality would make the doctrine of inequitable conduct mostly
unnecessary because if a patent is invalid based on a reference, it is invalid
regardless of whether the inventor withheld the reference.86 However, courts
have applied this test in antitrust actions as one of the necessary predicates to
find that a patentee committed an antitrust violation by fraudulently exploiting
an invalid patent.87 The “objective but for” test is the narrowest test for
materiality. A clear example of how this test is applied is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.88
In Walker Process, a patentee brought a suit for infringement against an
alleged infringer.89 The alleged infringer denied infringement and
counterclaimed, alleging the patentee violated the antitrust laws by
fraudulently exploiting its invalid patent.90 The court found the patent invalid
because during prosecution the applicant withheld that its invention was in
public use more than one year prior to the filing of its patent application.91
Under oath the applicant stated it did not know the invention was in public use
in the United States more than one year prior to its application.92 However, the
applicant knew its invention was in public use in the United States more than
one year prior to the application, because it sold and installed equipment
covered by the claims in the application.93 The court reasoned that but for this
withholding of information the patent would not have issued.94 If the applicant
was truthful and told the PTO about the prior use and sale, then the invention
claimed in the application would not have met the statutory requirements to
obtain a patent and the PTO would not have issued the patent.95

84. Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. at 1368.
85. Id.
86. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The doctrine of inequitable
conduct would still help where the prior art reference did not anticipate all of the patent’s claims
because it would render the entire patent unenforceable.
87. Raymond P. Niro et al., Nonstatutory Defenses in Patent Infringement Suits: Where Did
They Come From? Where Are They Going?, 320 PRACTISING LAW INST., PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 711, 749–50
(1991).
88. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
89. Id. at 173.
90. Id. at 173–74.
91. Id. at 174; see 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
92. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See note 21 and accompanying text.
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“Subjective But For” Test

The second “but for” test is called the “subjective but for” test. This test
evolved from the “objective but for” test and finds materiality in instances
where the “objective but for” test does not.96 The “subjective but for” test
focuses on the effect that any fraudulent misrepresentations, had on the
If the examiner issued the patent in reliance on
examiner.97
misrepresentations, then the references are material.98 One case applying the
“subjective but for” test of materiality is American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC.99
American Cyanamid Co. involved an appeal from a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) decision holding that drug companies violated the Federal
Trade Commission Act by engaging in a price fixing scheme with the
antibiotic tetracycline.100 Central to this holding was the FTC’s finding that
the drug companies deliberately made false and misleading statements to the
PTO and that they withheld material information from the PTO in order to
secure a patent on tetracycline.101 The Sixth Circuit remanded the case in
order to determine what, if any, effect these alleged misrepresentations had on
the patent examiner who granted the tetracycline patent.102 In the FTC
hearing, the patent examiner did not testify despite repeated requests by the
drug companies that the examiner testify, because the FTC found it would be
against PTO policy.103 The court found that the FTC could subpoena the
examiner as a witness, and it was necessary for the examiner to testify in order
to support the FTC’s holding.104 The court noted, “[T]he ultimate questions
are: Did [the patent examiner] receive all the information that he requested
from [the drug company]? And was [the patent examiner] mislead [sic] and
deceived by [the drug companies] and did he grant the tetracycline patent as
the result of such deception?”105 Thus, here is a clear example of what
constitutes materiality under the “subjective but for” test. The test focuses on
the state of mind of the actual patent examiner who issued the patent.

96. Goldman, supra note 1, at 55–60.
97. Jerome G. Lee et al., Equitable Defenses in Patent Cases, 320 PRACTISING LAW INST.,
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 571,
580–81 (1991).
98. See id.
99. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
100. Id. at 760.
101. Id. at 772.
102. Id. at 779.
103. Id. at 778.
104. American Cyanamid, 363 F.2d at 779.
105. Id. at 778.
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C. “But It May Have” Test
The third “but for” test is called the “but it may have” test. This test
encompasses even more material than the “subjective but for” test.106 This test
looks to whether misrepresentations in prosecution may have had an effect on
the examiner.107 One court described the test thusly: “[A] misrepresentation
which makes it ‘impossible for the Patent Office fairly to assess [the]
application against the prevailing statutory criteria,’ will, given the requisite
intent, lead to a finding of invalidity.”108 The court in SCM Corp. v. Radio
Corp. of America used this test to analyze the materiality of withheld
information.109
In SCM Corp., the PTO denied the applicant’s initial application based on
the prior art.110 In order to strengthen its application, the applicant conducted
testing to distinguish its invention from the prior art and filed the test results in
support of its application.111 In filing the affidavit with the test results, the
applicant withheld subsequent test data which contradicted its first test
results.112 After several amendments, the PTO granted the applicant’s
patent.113 The court found under both the objective and subjective “but for”
tests that the withheld test data was not material.114 However, the court still
held the patent unenforceable because of the withheld test data.115 The court
reasoned that “any inequitable conduct on the part of the applicant in obtaining
a patent will be sufficient to dissuade a court of equity from rendering him its
aid in enforcing the patent against infringers.”116 In so holding, the court
106. Lee et al., supra note 97, at 581.
107. Id.
108. In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. 1353, 1369 (D. Del. 1975)
(alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). The court in Frost Patent found a patent invalid
where the applicant “knew or should have known that the undisclosed information in its
possession could have refuted the arguments it was making to the Patent Office.” Id. at 1373. In
addition, “A misrepresentation is material when its existence might have influenced a patent
examiner.” Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 497 F.Supp. 661, 689 (D. Del. 1980). The
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks also adopted this test in In re Altenpohl, 198 U.S.P.Q.
289, 310 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1976) (“Further, the materiality of the prior art withheld need not
necessarily be such that applicant or counsel believed it would render any of the claims
unpatentable. It need only be such that the patent might not have issued had full disclosure been
made.”).
109. 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
110. Id. at 440.
111. Id. at 444.
112. Id. at 446.
113. Id.
114. SCM Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 449.
115. Id. at 450.
116. Id. at 449. The court went on to state:
No one can tell with certainty what would have happened if [the applicant] had dealt
fairly with the Patent Office. But the fact remains that [the applicant] did withhold
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rejected both the subjective and objective “but for” tests for materiality and
focused on whether the withheld information was relevant.117 Thus, the court
expanded the test for materiality beyond that which would be included in the
objective or subjective “but for” tests. Later courts named the test used in
SCM Corp. the “but it may have” test.118
D. Old Rule 56 Subjective Test
In 1977, the PTO amended Rule 56 to state that “information is material
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would
consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a
patent.”119 The Federal Circuit has stated that courts may use several tests in
determining the minimum threshold of materiality, but PTO Rule 56 is the
appropriate starting point.120 The Federal Circuit accepted this guideline by
noting that it is meant to describe how an applicant ought to conduct business
with the PTO.121 The Federal Circuit has noted that “the pertinent inquiry is
not whether a reasonable examiner would want to be aware of a particular
thing, but whether, after he was aware of it, he would ‘consider it important’ in
deciding whether to reject one or more claims.”122
A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp. illustrates how courts apply the
reasonable patent examiner test.123 In A.B. Dick, the inventor knew of prior
references disclosing methods similar to what he regarded as the most
important part of his invention.124 However, neither the inventor nor his
attorney disclosed the references to the PTO during prosecution of the
patent.125 Six years into prosecution of the patent, the examiner found the
references and rejected claims in the application based on them.126 The

relevant facts. Which side in this litigation is to suffer from this conduct? It is
appropriate that it should be [the applicant] who suffers. . . . The evidence here justifies
the conclusion that this court should not enforce a patent obtained under these
circumstances.
Id. at 449–50.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. 1353, 1368 (D.
Del. 1975).
119. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977).
120. See Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1440 (Fed Cir. 1991);
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed Cir. 1984); Am. Hoist & Derrick
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
121. See Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1440; Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363.
122. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363 n.2.
123. 798 F.2d 1392, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The invention in this case was ink jet printing.
Id. at 1393.
124. Id. at 1397.
125. Id. at 1396.
126. Id. at 1397.
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applicant amended the claims, and the examiner allowed the amended claims
in light of the references the applicant withheld but the examiner eventually
discovered.127 The court held that the applicant engaged in inequitable conduct
by intentionally withholding the prior art references.128 The court used the
“reasonable patent examiner” standard to determine if the prior references
were material.129 The court found that the prior references were material
because: (1) the inventor stated that the references described methods similar
to his, (2) the inventor stated that these methods were the “most important
part” of his invention, and (3) after the examiner found the references, the
examiner rejected claims in the application.130 Thus, the court noted it was
obvious that a reasonable examiner would have considered the references
important in examining a patent, because here the references actually resulted
in changing the patent.131
The patent bar criticized the decision in this case because the court held a
patent invalid based on the applicant’s failure to disclose references that the
examiner subsequently discovered before the patent issued.132 However, this is
a clear example of how the “reasonable patent examiner” test operates. The
result in this case would come out different today after a 1992 amendment to
the rules, because the new rules allow an applicant to submit material
information at any time before a patent issues, without penalty, so long as the
applicant follows certain procedures.133
E.

Current Rule 56 Objective Test

The PTO issued a new standard of materiality in 1992 which focused on
more objective determinations of what is material information.134
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to
information already of record . . . and
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima
facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or

127. Id. at 1398.
128. A.B. Dick Co., 798 F.2d at 1400.
129. Id. at 1398.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See e.g., Lee et al., supra note 97, at 591.
133. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97–98 (2005). Rule 1.97 sets time requirements on when the applicant
must file an information disclosure statement. 37 C.F.R. § 1.97. Rule 1.98 requires the
information disclosure statement to include “[a] list of all patents, publications, applications, or
other information submitted for consideration by the [PTO].” 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(1). Rule 1.98
also requires a legible copy of the information submitted, a concise explanation of the relevance
of any information not in English or a translation, and other procedural requirements. 37 C.F.R. §
1.98(a)(2)–(3).
134. Id. § 1.56(b).
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(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in:
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information
compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of
evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest
reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and before any
consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to
establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.135

From 1982 until 2005, the Federal Circuit used the old Rule 56 standard to
determine materiality.136 Recently, the Federal Circuit decided that for patent
applications pending on or filed after March 16, 1992, it will use the new Rule
56 standard to determine materiality.137
In Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., the Federal Circuit
addressed whether or not the district court erred in granting summary judgment
to an alleged infringer because of inequitable conduct by an applicant.138 The
court held the district court erred in granting summary judgment with respect
to the applicant’s failure to cite three references in its application.139 For the
first reference, the court held that a concurrent patent application filed by the
applicant was material to the patent in suit under both the old Rule 56 and new
Rule 56.140 However, the alleged infringer failed to meet its burden under
summary judgment to prove the requisite intent to deceive.141 For the second
reference, the court held that the alleged infringer failed to show a prior patent
met either standard of materiality.142 For the third reference, the court held that
a contrary decision of another examiner reviewing a similar claim met either
standard of materiality.143 However, the court did not address whether the
applicant met its standard to prove intent to deceive.144
The Federal Circuit in Dayco Products stated that for patent applications
prosecuted before the PTO’s 1992 change in Rule 56 it would use the
“reasonable patent examiner” standard for materiality.145 The applicant filed
135. Id.
136. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 72–73.
137. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
138. 329 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1365–66.
141. Id. at 1366.
142. Id. at 1367.
143. Dayco Products, 329 F.3d at 1368.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1364.
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three of the patents-in-suit in Dayco after the January 17, 1992 change in Rule
56.146 However, the court did not resolve which standard of materiality it
would use because it found that under either test the outcome was the same
with respect to the three withheld references at issue.147 Presently, the Federal
Circuit analyzes materiality for patents pending on or filed after March 16,
1992, under the new Rule 56 test.148
Since inequitable conduct defenses first started popping up in patent
infringement suits, the standard of materiality has been broadened from the
objective “but for” standard to the “reasonable patent examiner” standard.
With the adoption of new Rule 56, the PTO attempted to narrow the standard
in order to fix perceived problems created by the broadening of the rule.
IV. POLICIES OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
Before deciding on which materiality test best serves the doctrine of
inequitable conduct, it is important to look at the policies behind inequitable
conduct to determine which test best promotes the most important policies of
inequitable conduct. Three purposes the doctrine of inequitable conduct serves
are: (1) to punish an applicant for misrepresenting information, falsifying
information, or lying during examination proceedings, (2) to make sure the
patent examiner has all pertinent information when making a determination on
patentability, and (3) to minimize the burden on the court system of frivolous
inequitable conduct claims and promote the certainty of patents. Arguably, the
most valuable patents are litigated, and litigation effectively brings any
withheld information to light. As such, the standard of materiality used by the
courts should conform to the first purpose of the inequitable conduct doctrine,
punishing a dishonest applicant, while also addressing concerns of the third
purpose, minimizing the burden on the courts and promoting the certainty of
patents.
A.

Punishing Dishonest Applicants

The first purpose of the inequitable conduct doctrine is to punish an
applicant who misrepresents information, falsifies information, or lies during
examination proceedings.149 This purpose of inequitable conduct doctrine
comes from the equity maxim that “he who comes into equity must come with

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
149. See John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of
Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 234 (1999)
(“Alternatively, we may wish to uphold traditional inequitable conduct doctrine by punishing
behavior we wish to deter, rather than by exploring the consequences of that behavior.”).
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clean hands.”150 In defining materiality in this context a balance must be
struck between two sides. First, the definition of materiality must be expansive
enough for it to have any real meaning. If the definition only encompasses
information that would invalidate a patent, then without inequitable conduct
the patent would inevitably be invalid anyway.151 However, as the definition
becomes more expansive there becomes more of an incentive for alleged
infringers to charge inequitable conduct during litigation proceedings.152 This
will prolong litigation, as the court system must determine whether an
applicant engaged in inequitable conduct with respect to withheld
information.153 It also may result in taking away patent protection for worthy
inventions just because a patentee did not disclose some trivial matter.154
B.

Making Sure the Patent Examiner Has All Pertinent Information

The second purpose of inequitable conduct doctrine, making sure the
examiner has all pertinent information, is set out in Rule 56. The rule states,
“A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public
interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when,
at the time an application is being examined, the [PTO] is aware of and
evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability.”155 The
decision in Precision Instrument, one of the first cases finding a patent
unenforceable for inequitable conduct, also supports this purpose.156 The
Court stated that a patent affects the public interest.157 Patents serve the public
purpose of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts by giving the
patent holder a monopoly in his invention.158 The public has a valid interest in
denying a patent monopoly where the patentee engaged in inequitable conduct
or fraud to obtain his patent.159 Therefore, a patentee must come into an
infringement suit with clean hands.160
However, the statutory requirements for a patent are adequate to make sure
the examiner has all pertinent information. If an applicant does not disclose
150. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); see
supra note 50.
151. See supra Part III.A. However, inequitable conduct would still help in situations where a
prior art reference does not anticipate all of a patent’s claims.
152. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 89; Rene D. Tegtmeyer, A Refocusing on Inequitable
Conduct in New Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 194 (1992).
153. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 846–47; Lee, supra note 8, at 132.
154. See John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability
Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 9 (1988).
155. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2005).
156. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
157. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
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some material information during the examination process and the patent is
litigated, the information will come to light during litigation. To accomplish
this, some interested party must copy the patented device or method and either
sue the patent holder for declaratory judgment or be sued by the patent holder
for infringement.161 Then, the alleged infringing party will bring to light all
information possible in order to secure a ruling invalidating the patent,
including any information the patent holder withheld during prosecution of the
patent. If a patent is not litigated, and material information was withheld from
the PTO during prosecution, then obviously litigation will not help to bring the
information to light. For a non-litigated patent there are two possible
scenarios: (1) if the applicant disclosed the withheld information the patent
would not have issued, or (2) even if the applicant disclosed the withheld
information the patent would still have issued. In the next three sections of this
Comment, the arguments as they pertain to non-litigated bad patents, nonlitigated valid patents, and litigated patents are addressed, concluding that
inequitable conduct is not necessary to make sure the examiner has all
pertinent information. After that discussion is a focus on reexamination
proceedings and why they do not solve the problems created by high cost
patent litigation.
1.

Non-litigated Bad Patent

In the first scenario, where the applicant withheld material information and
the PTO would not have granted the patent if the applicant disclosed the
information, there is an invalid patent out in the marketplace potentially
deterring others from practicing what was patented. Some noted commentators
have given reasons why the perceived social costs from this scenario are not all
that great.
One study showed that litigation is more likely to occur early on in the life
of a patent and the most valuable patents are litigated.162 The study showed
that if a patent is litigated the most probable time for the litigation to end is
161. “A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 281 (2000). What constitutes infringement of a patent is set out in 35 U.S.C. § 271:
“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within
the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefore, infringes the patent.” The Declaratory Judgment Act states,
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States,
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or
decree and shall be reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
162. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 460 (2004). This study based
its findings on the assumption that litigated patents are valuable patents and that value is
measured by the economic benefit an individual patent has to its owner. Id. at 439–40.
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three years from the date of issuance of the patent and that as time passes the
probability drops.163 Therefore, the authors of the study reasoned that it is rare
for a patent to become valuable and be litigated late in its life.164 Based on this
study, the social cost of relying on litigation to bring out information is lower
than expected because the most valuable patents will be litigated, and that
litigation will happen early in the life of the patent.
Another noted author on the subject, Mark A. Lemley, has asserted that
litigation is more economically feasible to weed out bad patents than is
Lemley countered potential
strengthening the examination process.165
objections to his argument. In response to what he termed “in terrorem
effects” (the concern that potential competitors will be deterred from entering a
field because of the existence of patents owned by their competitors), Lemley
argued that for bad patents that are neither litigated nor licensed, potential
competitors will not even be aware of them and thus will not be deterred.166
Thus, inequitable conduct is not needed to stop bad patents from entering the
marketplace, because if the patent is valuable it will be litigated and if it is
neither valuable nor litigated, then its holder likely will not enforce it.
2.

Non-litigated Valid Patent

In the second scenario, where the applicant withheld material information
but the PTO still would have granted the patent if the applicant disclosed the
information, there is no reason why this information needs to come to light,
whether through the applicant disclosing it (for fear that if the applicant did not
the applicant could be subject to inequitable conduct), or through litigation.
The PTO may prefer that applicants disclose information such as this if it is a
close call, but in the end if the patent is valid, the patent is valid.
3.

Problems in Relying on Litigation

In the third scenario—where the applicant withheld material information,
obtained a patent, and the patent is litigated—relying on litigation to bring all
material information to light has some drawbacks. First, it creates a drag on
the court system to rely on litigation to bring out information.167 Second, it
costs a lot of money for an interested party to copy a patented method or

163. See id. at 477. The data for this study came from “all issued U.S. patents from 1963
through 1999 (2,925,537 patents in total) [compared] with all patents for which a lawsuit was
filed in any federal court and which terminated during 1999–2000 (6,861 patents in total).” Id. at
445 (internal citation omitted).
164. Id. at 460.
165. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1531–32 (2001).
166. Id. at 1516–17.
167. But see id. at 1510–11 (arguing that it is more cost effective to deal with bad patents
through litigation than through stronger examination proceedings).
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device and then enter into litigation in an attempt to secure a ruling
invalidating the patent.168 Because of this cost deterrence, there may be a long
period of time before an interested party with enough money will challenge the
patent in light of the undisclosed information.
In a recent article, Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges discussed why
litigation does not work to fix prosecution errors.169 They believe that because
of economic factors the patentee has more of an incentive to win in patent
litigation and that because of this skewed incentive the patentee will spend
more money to win litigation.170 They also make the assumption that the side
that spends the most money in litigation is more likely to win.171 Thus,
because of economic incentives the patentee is more likely to win in litigation.
The economic factors giving the patentee a greater incentive to win than the
alleged infringer are termed the “public good problem” and “pass-through
problem.”172
The “public good problem” arises from the nature of a patent. Any party
wishing to challenge a patent’s validity must, if it wins, share its victory with
the rest of the world, including its competitors.173 This forced sharing deters
an alleged infringer’s incentive to see litigation to its finish, especially if there
is an attractive settlement offer by the patentee.174 The “pass-through
problem” arises from the effect of multiple infringers passing the royalties they
must pay to use a patented method or device on to the consumer.175 The result
of this effect is that even if all the infringers combined together, they still
would not have as great an incentive to win in litigation as the patentee.176
Farrell and Merges also pointed out other deterrents of challenging a patent
in litigation. If the alleged infringer loses, the court may order a permanent
injunction against the infringer, forcing the infringer out of the market
completely.177 Also, the patentee may charge higher royalties against
168. Id. at 1502. A 1999 American Intellectual Property Law Association report estimated
that the median cost of patent litigation is $799,000 for each side through the end of discovery
and $1,503,000 for each side through trial and appeal. Id.
169. Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 943 (2004).
170. Id. at 948.
171. Id. at 948–49.
172. Id. at 948.
173. Id. at 952; Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 668 (2004). Miller posits that giving a
successful patent challenger a “cash bounty” will encourage the litigation of patents and thus
reduce the social cost of having invalidly issued patents. Id. at 704–05.
174. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 952; Miller, supra note 173, at 668.
175. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 953.
176. Id. at 953–54.
177. Id. at 956.
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infringers who challenge the patent than against infringers who quietly pay
royalties instead of challenging.178 Farrell and Merges believe this system
encourages settlement in cases involving invalid patents.179 The result of all
this is a high social cost created by invalid patents in the marketplace deterring
others from using what should not have been patented in the first place.180
Ultimately the cost is then borne by the public at large.181
Empirical data shows that in litigation the patent holder has an advantage
over the alleged infringer. One study that included all final decisions on
validity resulting in written opinions reported in the United States Patents
Quarterly from 1989 through 1996 noted that 54% out of 300 decisions found
the patent valid.182 This study also noted that 49 out of 73 (67.1%) patents
tried before a jury were found valid, while 23 out of 82 (28.1%) patents
decided on pre-trial motion were found valid, and 82 out of 143 (57.3%)
patents tried in bench trials were found valid.183 Thus, a patent tried before a
jury is more likely to be held valid than a patent tried before the court or
decided on pre-trial motion.184
Another study conducted from data of terminated patent cases compiled
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts found that the
patentee won 706 out of 1209 (58%) cases.185 This study also found the
178. Id.
179. Id. at 968.
180. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 968.
181. Id. The authors did propose solutions to the inadequacy of litigation to fix Patent Office
errors, including improving Patent Office examination proceedings by regularly having more than
one examiner assess an application and providing for a greater range of penalties for inequitable
conduct to encourage the disclosure of information. See id. at 960–63. A greater range of
penalties would make it more likely for courts to enforce inequitable conduct doctrine because a
court may be reluctant to completely invalidate a patent in a close case. Id. at 961.
182. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 187−88, 205 (1998). This study did state that it could not predict
with confidence the hypothesis that patents are more likely to be held valid than invalid, because
the p-value for this test is greater than .1 which is an indication that there is no statistical
significance in the hypothesis. Id. at 206 & n.54.
183. Id. at 212. The hypothesis that there is no difference between the likelihood of a patent
tried to a jury, tried to a court, and resolved before trial being found invalid was rejected with a pvalue of less than .001 indicating statistical significance in the percentage differences. Id. at 213.
184. See id.
185. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 380, 385 (2000). In this study the hypothesis that either party
has an equal chance of winning a patent lawsuit was rejected with a p-value of less than .01
indicating a statistical significance in the percentage difference. Id. at 385 & n.82. In the study,
[a] case was considered won by the patentee if the patentee won at least one patent claim
in its entirety. If the patentee claimed two patents were infringed and the court concluded
that one of the two patents was valid, enforceable, and infringed, it was considered a
verdict for the patentee, even if the other patent was held invalid or not infringed. If,
however, the infringer prevailed on any issue with respect to each claim, it was considered
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patentee win rate exceeded 68% for jury cases compared with a win rate of
51% for bench trials.186 On the issue of validity, this study found that the
patent holder won 775 out of 1151 (67%) times.187 Thus, based on this data
set, a jury is more likely than a judge to find a patent valid, enforceable, and
infringed.188 The study also found that an appellate court was unlikely to
overturn the issue of validity, with 78% of 443 decisions upheld.189 Both of
these studies show the patentee has an advantage in litigation over an alleged
infringer. This is another drawback in relying on the litigation system to bring
to light withheld information. Even with these problems, the adversarial nature
of litigation makes it more effective at bringing out information than ex parte
patent prosecution.190
4.

Reexamination Proceedings: An Ineffective Solution to High Cost
Litigation

In response to the problems of high cost patent litigation, Congress created
the reexamination proceeding, which allows the patentee, a third party, or the
PTO to request a reexamination of a patent in light of new information.191
There are two types of reexamination proceedings—ex parte and inter partes.
Ex parte reexamination, created in 1980, allows a third party to request a
proceeding by citing to the PTO previously uncited prior art; but after the
initial request for a new proceeding the third party is only given one more
chance to respond to the patentee’s arguments before the proceeding is
conducted like an initial examination without the third party.192 Because the
a verdict for the infringer. For example, if the patent was held valid and enforceable, but
not infringed, this case would be considered won by the infringer.
Id. at 385 n.81.
186. Id. at 386–87.
187. Id. at 390 tbl.4. On the issue of validity, when broken down between judge and jury, the
jury found the patent valid 389 out of 551 (71%) times and the judge found the patent valid 387
out of 601 (64%) times. Id.
188. See id. at 390.
189. Id. at 399 tbl.7.
190. Von Tersch, supra note 70, at 434.
191. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 965.
192. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (“Any person at any time may file a request for
reexamination by the [PTO] of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art [patents or
printed publications].”).
If . . . the Director finds that a substantial new question of patentability affecting any
claim of a patent is raised, the determination will include an order for reexamination of
the patent for resolution of the question. The patent owner will be given a reasonable
period, not less than two months from the date a copy of the determination is given or
mailed to him, within which he may file a statement on such question, including any
amendment to his patent and new claim or claims he may wish to propose, for
consideration in the reexamination.
Id. § 304.
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proceeding does not give the person requesting the reexamination a good
opportunity to challenge the patent, less than 1% of issued U.S. patents are
challenged by a reexamination request.193 Out of the less than 1% of patents
challenged by reexamination, cancellation results in only 12.2% of the cases.194
In response to the shortcomings of the ex parte reexamination proceeding,
Congress created the inter partes reexamination proceeding in 1999.195 The
inter partes reexamination differs from the ex parte in two principal aspects.
First, the inter partes reexamination gives the party requesting reexamination
the opportunity to file written comments every time the patent owner files a
response to an action on the merits from the PTO.196 This gives third parties
more of a say in the reexamination proceeding, which is the major drawback of
the ex parte proceeding. This new freedom comes at a cost as the second
major difference is that after the inter partes reexamination the requester
cannot revisit any issue raised in the proceeding in a later trial.197 Thus, the
PTO’s determination in the inter partes reexamination is final. Because of this,
through 2003 there have been only twenty-six requests for inter partes
reexamination.198 Therefore, given that the reexamination proceeding is
infrequently used, it is not an effective means of correcting errors in the initial
examination process and curbing high cost patent litigation.

193. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 966 (citing USPTO, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2003 119 tbl.13a, available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/annual/2003/2003annualreport.pdf). The USPTO 2003 fiscal report also
showed that in 2003 only 392 total requests for reexamination were filed and 239 out of the 392
were requested by a third party. Id.
194. Id. at 966 n.67 (citing Stuart J.H. Graham et al., Post-Issue Patent “Quality Control”: A
Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8807, 2002)).
195. Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I,
113 Stat. 1501A-567 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (2000)).
196. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)(3).
Each time that the patent owner files a response to an action on the merits from the Patent
and Trademark Office, the third-party requester shall have one opportunity to file written
comments addressing issues raised by the action of the Office or the patent owner’s
response thereto, if those written comments are received by the Office within 30 days
after the date of service of the patent owner’s response.
Id.
197. Id. § 315(c).
A third-party requester whose request for an inter partes reexamination results in an order
under section 313 is estopped from asserting at a later time, in any civil action arising in
whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28, United States Code, the invalidity of any
claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any ground which the third-party
requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings.
Id.
198. Farrell & Merges, supra note 169, at 967 (citing USPTO, supra note 193, at 119
tbl.13b).
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C. Minimizing Burden on Court System
The legal standard used to determine whether inequitable conduct occurred
is important because of the abundance of parties asserting the inequitable
conduct defense in patent infringement actions.199 As the Federal Circuit noted
“the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case
has become an absolute plague.”200 A relaxation of the standard for materiality
encourages alleged infringers to assert the defense when the facts of the
situation may not support it.201 This results in inefficiencies in the court
system, increased legal fees, and possible damage to the reputation of parties
against whom the defense is asserted.202 Tightening the standard may
discourage alleged infringers from asserting the defense, which could result in
invalid patents in the market.203 This damages the patent system and the public
at large by giving the holder of an invalid patent the right to prevent others
from using what the patent holder had no right to patent. Courts must strike a
balance somewhere to prevent parties from withholding information while also
keeping frivolous litigation from prolonging patent infringement actions.
Instead of tightening the standard of materiality to reduce any perceived
burdens on the court system, one commentator has argued that if the Federal
Circuit gives more deference to the district courts’ decisions on inequitable
conduct, the burden will lessen on the court system and it will create earlier
certainty in a patent’s enforceability.204 Therefore, reducing the burden on the
court system should be accomplished by giving more deference to district court
decisions on inequitable conduct, and reducing the burden on the court system
should be a secondary consideration in determining the standard of materiality.
D. Conclusion
The above discussion argues that the doctrine of inequitable conduct is best
justified as punishment for an applicant who engages in dishonest activity and
not as a tool to encourage applicants to reveal information. The ideal test for
materiality may differ based on which purpose the defense of inequitable
conduct is trying to serve. Because litigation has the ability to bring out
199. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 1, at 89; Lawrence R. LaPorte et al., New Rule 56, The
Evolving Standard of Disclosure, and Litigation Sanctions Available for Inequitable Conduct,
669 PRACTISING LAW INST. PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1163, 1168–69 (2001); Tegtmeyer, supra note 152, at 194.
200. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (vacating
trial court’s grant of summary judgment for party asserting inequitable conduct where the facts
did not show by clear and convincing evidence the patent attorney engaged in inequitable
conduct).
201. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 89; Tegtmeyer, supra note 152, at 194.
202. See Lee, supra note 8, at 132; Anderson, supra note 3, at 846–47.
203. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 867–68.
204. Id. at 870.
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withheld information, the proper standard of materiality should conform to the
purpose of punishing bad behavior on the part of applicants before the PTO.
There are some social costs in relying on litigation to bring out withheld
information, but these hard-to-quantify social costs are not as high as expected
because most valuable patents are litigated early in their life and bad patents
with little value are not likely to deter competitors.205 Also, because the
Federal Circuit giving greater deference to district court decisions can reduce
the burden on the court system, reducing the burden on the courts should be a
secondary consideration in determining the standard of materiality.
V. COURTS SHOULD USE THE REASONABLE PATENT EXAMINER STANDARD
FOR MATERIALITY
Since, as argued above, the primary purpose of inequitable conduct is to
punish applicants for misrepresenting, withholding, or falsifying material
information, the test used to determine what information is material should
conform to that purpose instead of the purpose of making sure the patent
examiner has all necessary information when examining the patent. The courts
should use the old Rule 56 subjective test to determine materiality because it is
expansive enough to give the doctrine some teeth and it allows the court to
make an equitable determination based on all the facts to decide whether or not
withheld information is material. Old Rule 56 states: “[I]nformation is
material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner
would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to
issue as a patent.”206 The following sections analyze the shortcomings in the
five tests that courts have used to determine materiality and support the
conclusion that the Federal Circuit and PTO should adopt the old Rule 56
reasonable examiner standard.
A.

“Objective But For” Test

Courts have rejected the “objective but for” test because it is too narrow in
its definition of what information is material.207 The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in Norton v. Curtiss stated, “Findings of materiality should not
be limited only to those situations where there can be no dispute that the true
facts . . . if they had been known, would most likely have prevented the
allowance of the particular claims at issue . . . .”208 The court reasoned a
subjective determination of materiality better fostered the necessary
relationship of trust between applicants and the PTO by expanding the types of

205.
206.
207.
208.

Allison et al., supra note 162, at 460; Lemley, supra note 165, at 1531–32.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977).
See, e.g., Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794–95 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
Id. at 795.
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misconduct for which courts will penalize applicants.209 The court noted that
honesty was so vital to the relationship between an applicant and the PTO
because the PTO’s time constraints and lack of testing facilities force it to rely
on applicants to provide complete and accurate information.210
Thus, the “objective but for” test does not adequately serve the main
purpose of inequitable conduct, to punish dishonest applicants, because the test
is too narrow and does not include enough types of information. With this test
the doctrine of inequitable conduct would effectively have no teeth. The test
also does not help provide the PTO with all information needed to determine
patentability because its strict standard does not discourage applicants from
withholding information. This test may be the best to keep frivolous
inequitable conduct claims from creating a burden on the court system, but as
argued above, this should only be a secondary consideration in determining
which test courts should use.
B.

“Subjective But For” Test

The shortcomings of the “subjective but for” test for materiality are
illustrated in the American Cyanamid case discussed in Part III.B. above. In its
decision, the court stated that the patent examiner did not testify at the original
hearing because it would have been against PTO policy.211 If this test is used
to determine materiality there will be cases where the patent examiner is not
available to testify. This would make it nearly impossible to ascertain what
effect any alleged misrepresentations had on the patent examiner’s decision to
issue a patent. If the examiner was unavailable, the only way to determine if
the alleged misrepresentations had an effect on the examiner’s decision would
be to look at the file history of the patent, from which it would be very difficult
to extrapolate the examiner’s state of mind.212
209. Id. at 794.
210. Id.
211. American Cyanamid Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 363 F.2d 757, 778–79 (6th Cir. 1966);
see MPEP, supra note 68, at § 1701.01 (“It is the policy of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) that its employees, including patent examiners, will not appear as
witnesses or give testimony in legal proceedings . . . . Any employee who testifies contrary to this
policy will be dismissed or removed.”). The reasons for this policy are set out as follows:
(a) To conserve the time of Department employees for conducting official business; (b)
To minimize the possibility of involving the Department in controversial issues that are
not related to the Department’s mission; (c) To prevent the possibility that the public will
misconstrue variances between personal opinions of Department employees and
Department policy; (d) To avoid spending the time and money of the United States for
private purposes; (e) To preserve the integrity of the administrative process; and (f) To
protect confidential, sensitive information and the deliberative process of the Department.
15 C.F.R. § 15.13 (2005).
212. See Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 268 (D. Mass. 1955), aff’d, 237 F.2d 428
(1st Cir. 1956) (“But from a broad consideration of the file wrapper of the patent as a whole, I
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In terms of the purposes of inequitable conduct, the “subjective but for”
test, like the “objective but for” test, does not encompass enough types of
withheld information for the doctrine to effectively punish dishonest
applicants. The additional factor required to prove inequitable conduct using
this test, reliance by the examiner on the applicant’s misrepresentations, makes
this test even more impractical than the “objective but for” test. Like the
“objective but for” test, this test would discourage alleged infringers from
asserting inequitable conduct, but because reducing the burden on the court
system is only a secondary consideration, this factor alone should not be
controlling.
C. “But It May Have” Test
In SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, discussed above in Part III.C.,
the court noted reasons why the test it formulated for materiality was
correct.213 The court reasoned that the objective and subjective “but for” tests
fail to discourage an applicant from withholding material information because
it is impracticable for a court ruling in an infringement action to determine if
the patent in suit would have issued if the applicant had disclosed all material
information.214
However, the “but it may have” test is highly speculative and gives the
court too much latitude in making a determination of materiality.215 While this
may seem to go along with the equitable nature of inequitable conduct
doctrine, it makes it very difficult for patent attorneys and inventors to decide
what they must disclose to the PTO. This test would encourage applicants to
disclose more material than necessary to make a determination on
patentability, which would increase the time needed for the examiner to review
the information, making the patent process less efficient.
This test would definitely further the punishment purpose of inequitable
conduct doctrine, but it goes too far. Adopting this test for materiality would
believe that the statement complained of, although factually untrue . . . . did not deceive or
mislead the examiner in his consideration of the patentability of the application pending before
him.”).
213. 318 F. Supp. 433, 449–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Later courts named the test the “but it may
have” test. E.g., In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F.Supp. 1353, 1368 (D. Del.
1975).
214. SCM Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 449–50.
Any other rule would fail adequately to discourage conduct of this sort merely because of
the circumstance, which must be present in many cases, that it turns out to be
impracticable to ascertain what the Examiner, who did not know the true facts, would
have done if he had known them.
Id.
215. Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont’l Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 900 (10th Cir. 1979). The court
concluded the “but it might have been” test is too speculative and the “subjective but for” test is
more practical. Id.
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strongly encourage alleged infringers to assert inequitable conduct on the hope
that a court will find a possibility that withheld information may have had an
effect on patentability.
D. Current Rule 56 Objective Test
The PTO promulgated the new Rule 56 standard in order to reduce the
amount of inequitable conduct defenses litigated before the Federal Circuit and
also to provide greater certainty in the field of inequitable conduct.216 The
PTO hoped the new rule would result in less inequitable conduct litigation,
thus reducing the expenses of litigation for a patent owner.217
Several commentators have stated that the Federal Circuit should adopt the
new Rule 56 standard in order to provide earlier certainty and greater
uniformity in patent actions.218 Commentators have also stated that the new
standard would help to discourage frivolous claims of inequitable conduct.219
However, a more stringent test, such as the new Rule 56 standard, would result
in a patent applicant disclosing less information than under a broader
standard.220 The disclosure of less information would give the PTO less
information on which to base the decision of whether or not to grant a patent.
Although the new Rule 56 standard appears to help discourage applicants
from asserting frivolous claims of inequitable conduct, thus reducing the
burden on the court system, adoption of the new standard would give courts
less leeway in determining whether or not inequitable conduct occurred based
on the specific facts of a case. In this respect the new Rule 56 does not
adequately punish dishonest applicants. It is more desirable for the Federal
Circuit to keep the old Rule 56 standard in order to give the district courts
broad discretion in making determinations on what is material.
E.

Old Rule 56 Subjective Test

In the late 1980s the patent bar noted a need to change the law on
inequitable conduct because the old Rule 56 test encouraged alleged infringers
216. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 95.
[The rule] change recognizes to some degree the unnecessary problems and expenses that
are caused when questions of inequitable conduct arise in litigation based on allegedly
withheld or misrepresented information not affecting patentability. The standard of
materiality under prior Rule 56 was less definite and certain and broader. There was,
therefore, more of an opportunity for a defendant to question the patentee[’]s conduct
before the PTO.
Tegtmeyer, supra note 152, at 194.
217. Tegtmeyer, supra note 152, at 194.
218. See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 97, at 633; Anderson, supra note 3, at 864–65.
219. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 3, at 865. Anderson reasoned that frivolous claims
would be discouraged “because clients would be less inclined to pay for defenses that have no
chance of succeeding.” Id.
220. See id. at 867–68.
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to charge patentees with inequitable conduct.221 While the “reasonable patent
examiner” test sought to promote candor and fairness, commentators noticed
problems with the test such as: (1) it created confusion and uncertainty as to
the enforceability of patents, thus encouraging litigants to assert the defense of
inequitable conduct, even if the facts did not support the defense, (2) it denied
patents to many worthy inventions, (3) it made settlements more difficult, and
(4) it diverted attention away from the merits of the case.222 Commentators
also believe that under the old Rule 56 test it is hard for applicants to determine
what is required of them in their dealings with the PTO.223
Even with these perceived shortcomings in the old Rule 56 reasonable
patent examiner test, this test best furthers the main purposes of inequitable
conduct. This test does the best job of balancing between being expansive
enough to effectively punish dishonest applicants while at the same time not
creating a large burden on the court system. If the main purpose of inequitable
conduct doctrine is to punish dishonest applicants, then it is most beneficial to
have a test for materiality that is expansive enough to give the court more
discretion in making an inequitable conduct determination.
Under a
punishment rationale for inequitable conduct, more discretion is desired
because in the circumstance where an applicant has high levels of intent to
deceive, but a low level of materiality, a court should find the applicant
engaged in inequitable conduct. If the court does not have adequate discretion
under the materiality standard however, then the low level of materiality may
not rise above the threshold level needed and the court cannot find the
applicant engaged in inequitable conduct.
The two main purposes that inequitable conduct doctrine should serve are:
(1) punishment and (2) reducing the burden on the court system. The more
expansive definitions do a better job at punishing dishonest applicants, while
narrower definitions help reduce the burden on the court system and promote
the certainty of patents. Organizing the tests along this spectrum from
expansive to narrow would look like this: “but it may have”; old Rule 56
reasonable patent examiner; new Rule 56 prima facie patentability; “subjective
but for”; and “objective but for.” Because, as argued above in Part IV, the
primary purpose of inequitable conduct doctrine is to punish dishonest
applicants, a rule that serves that purpose more than the purpose of reducing
the burden on the court system is the best choice. Even though the “but it may
have” test gives the court more discretion to find materiality in a given
circumstance, it is too speculative. Because reducing the burden on the court

221. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 88–89.
222. Id. at 89; see LaPorte et al., supra note 199, at 1168–69.
223. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 95; Lee, supra note 8, at 132 (“The words ‘important’ and
‘reasonable’ [mean] different things to different judges and juries in different parts of the
country . . . .”).
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system is still a secondary consideration, the “but it may have” test is not the
best choice for the materiality standard.
Two of the reasons why the PTO changed Rule 56 in 1992 are: (1) the old
Rule 56 made it too difficult for practitioners to realize what was required of
them under the standard, and (2) the old Rule 56 standard was too expansive,
which encouraged alleged infringers to charge inequitable conduct with every
possible piece of related information they could find.224
In response to the first objection, that practitioners do not know what the
PTO expects of them under the old Rule 56, for any rule it will be hard to
determine exactly what information the applicant must disclose. It is
impossible to draft a rule that can consider every possible type of information
for every different scenario. Thus, a rule allowing a court to make an equitable
determination on what information is material best serves the policy of
punishing dishonest applicants.
In response to the second objection—that the standard is a drag on
litigation because it encourages alleged infringers to charge inequitable
conduct—the fact that an issue comes before a court frequently is not
necessarily a bad thing as long as the rule is best suited to further the policy
behind it. There needs to be some punishment for dishonesty before the PTO
because of the social implications involved in obtaining the right to exclude.
This punishment is best served by an expansive definition of materiality, which
allows a court to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.
One commentator on new Rule 56, in an article released a year after the
1992 change in Rule 56, stated that because of the diverse facts that come up in
inequitable conduct cases, true uniformity may not be possible, and it is best to
leave the standard for inequitable conduct up to the district courts to determine
on an equitable basis.225 In response to the drag on litigation, this commentator
asserted that limiting the number of reversals for abuse of discretion is the best
way to reduce the number of appeals.226 The short paragraph in that article
effectively sums up the argument here that the Federal Circuit should use the
old Rule 56 reasonable patent examiner standard of materiality because it
furthers the main purpose of inequitable conduct—punishing dishonest
applicants—by giving the court more discretion to determine if withheld
information is material.
The standard of materiality will continue to be the old Rule 56 reasonable
examiner standard for patents pending before March 16, 1992, and the new
Rule 56 standard for patents pending on or filed after March 16, 1992, unless
the Federal Circuit decides to adopt a different rule. Administrative change in
224. See Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992); Anderson, supra note
3, at 864–65.
225. Goldman, supra note 1, at 88.
226. Id.
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the PTO’s Rule 56 is not binding on the court system, but the Federal Circuit
has chosen to follow the PTO’s Rule 56. The best way to clarify the standard
of inequitable conduct and set it in stone would be a statutory change, which is
a possibility given that the Patent Reform Act of 2005 garnered significant
attention and review while purporting to give statutory guidance to inequitable
conduct determinations.227
VI. CONCLUSION
Clarifying the standard of materiality in inequitable conduct proceedings is
important so that patent attorneys and their clients know what the PTO expects
of them. There are three primary purposes that the doctrine of inequitable
conduct must serve: (1) to punish dishonest applicants, (2) to make sure the
examiner has all pertinent information, and (3) to reduce the burden on the
court system and promote the certainty of patents. Because the second
purpose, making sure the examiner has all pertinent information, can
adequately be served by litigation, and the third purpose, reducing the burden
on the court system, can be accomplished by the Federal Circuit giving district
courts more discretion in their inequitable conduct determinations, the standard
of materiality should seek to serve the first purpose of inequitable conduct,
punishing dishonest applicants.
Out of the five tests courts have used to determine materiality, the Federal
Circuit and PTO should adopt the old Rule 56 reasonable patent examiner
standard. This standard is the best balance between punishing dishonest
applicants while not creating too much of a burden in the court system. It
gives district courts broad discretion to determine if an applicant engaged in
inequitable conduct during patent prosecution. District courts need this
discretion to make an equitable determination, based on all the facts at hand,
on whether or not the applicant engaged in inequitable conduct. If the standard
was narrower, then in an instance where an applicant had a high level of intent
to deceive (and thus under the punishment rationale a court should find
inequitable conduct occurred) and a low level of materiality, the court would
be bound by the narrow standard of materiality and would not be able to
effectively punish the dishonest applicant.
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